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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE O·F UTAH 
J. B. & R. E. W ALI{ER, INC., 
a Utah Corporation and 
J. B. WALKER and GUDVOR W. 
BRABY, dba WALKER SAND & 
GRAVEL, ~co~MP'ANY, a { 
partnership, \ 
-vs.-
Plaintiff- Respondent, ( 
J. KENNETH THAYN dba 
THAYN CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, 
Defenda;nt -Appellant. 
Case 
No.10224 
BRIEF O·F RESPONDENT 
Respondent does not agree with the Statement of 
Facts or Statement of the Case as set forth in Brief of 
Appellant; primarily they are so inadequate and inaccur-
ate as to be of little or no aid to this Court in understand-
ing the issues presented to and determined by the Trial 
Court from 'vhich this appeal is taken. Respondent, 
l 
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therefore, deen1s it important to restate the ease so far 
as it relates to the points argued by Appellant. 
This appeal is concerned with only the first cause 
of action and the defenses presented by the pleadings and 
attempted to be established by the evidence. 
ISSUES: Plaintiff's first cause of action alleges 
the making of a lease on April 11, 1961, between the 
corporate plaintiff and defendant; that defendant had 
breached the contract by ( 1) assigning and conveying the 
same without the written consent of plaintiff, contrary 
to its written terms ; ( 2) by failure to pay taxes and 
rental as required by the lease terms; and (3) by failure 
to cause the leased area to be surveyed and fenced as 
required by the lease. (R. 1, 2, 3, 9 and 10). 
Defendant admitted making the lease but denied 
that he had violated its terms; denied that he had as-
signed the lease; and alleged that his failure to pay taxes 
and rentals was due to plaintiff's failure to designate 
and survey the particular area to be covered by the lease. 
(R. 21). 'Thereafter, in response to an affidavit by plain-
tiff alleging that the denial was untrue, sham and frivo-
lous, (R. 25, 26) that plaintiff had seen such an assign-
ment to one James C. Sumsion, defendant then (R .. 31) 
alleged that if plaintiff was referring to the agreement 
between defendant and Richard Sumsion and James 
Sumsion, such agreement was only temporary and tenta-
tive and that defendant had discussed the agreement 
with plaintiff. Defendant, shortly before trial, then 
filed another amendment to his answer alleging that if 
the ~Court found that there was such an assignment, 
plaintiff had waived any objections to it. 
2 
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The complaint further alleged that plaintiff had 
served a notice of termination, but defendant would not 
remove himself from the leased pre·mises; that defend-
ant was continuing in possession by his assignee, Sum-
sion; that defendant was denying any violation; and that 
it was essential to have the Court deelare 'vhether there 
had or had not been a termination of the lease by reason 
of the violations by defendant. 
These were the issues presented by the pleadings, 
so far as the first cause of action was concerned. 
FACTS: There was little or no dispute as to the 
essential facts; they were either stip·ulated or admitted. 
The particular leasehold provisions (R. 9) are as follows: 
"1. The Lessor hereby leases to the Lessee, 
for a term of fifteen (15) years, from the date of 
execution of this agreement, sufficient property 
located on the east side of Wasatch Boulevard, ap-
proximately three hundred feet north of the road-
base storage area, occupied by Lessor, all in Sec-
tion 23 and 24, Township 2 South, Range 1 E.ast, 
Salt Lake Base and Meridian, for the purpose set 
forth hereinabove, with the further provision 
that the Lessee, taking into consideration the re-
quirements necessary, will designate the area 
needed, which area will then be surveyed and the 
description of said property will be attached 
hereto and made a part hereof, as a supplemental 
agreement. 
"3. The L.essee agrees to pay the Lessor the 
sum of One ($1.00) Dollar per year, plus the pro-
rata property tax, as lease rental for the premises 
described herein. 
"4. The Lessee shall have the right to bring 
upon, install and operate upon the leased prem-
3 
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ises, all of the equipment of whatver kind 
necessary to operate and maintain the machinery 
enumerated hereinabove ; provided, however, that 
all operations of the Lessee upon said property 
shall be in such a manner as not to create a nui-
sance or a hazard to the public; that the property 
be adequately fenced; and that existing laws and 
regulations of the State of Utah be complied with 
in the operation of said premises, machinery and 
equipment. 
"8. :The Lessee agrees not to assign this lease 
or any part thereof or any of the rights hereunder, 
without first obtaining the written consent of 
the Lessor." 
Under date of November 12, 1963, defendant made 
an agreement, (Ex. P-1) vvith Richard Sumsion and 
James C. Sumsion, which was admitted in evidence with-
out objection. (R. 62-64). The pertinent portions are as 
follows: 
"'This Agreement made and entered into this 
12th day of November, 1963, by and between J. 
KE,NNE!TH THAYN, doing business as TH.AYN 
CO:NS'TRUCTION COMPANY, hereinafter called 
''TIHAYN' and RI1CHARD M. SUMSION, and 
JAME,S C. 'SUMSION, jointly, hereinafter called 
'SUMSION,' and 
"WHEREAS, Thayn is the owner of a cer-
tain lease-hold interest which he desires to assign 
to Sumsion, and 
"WHERE:AS, Thayn is the owner of certain 
personal property which he desires to sell to 
Sumsion, and 
"WHE~REAS Sumsion desires to lease the 
said lease-hold interest and to buy the said per-
sonal property, 
4 
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"NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of 
the mutual covenants of each of the parties, IT 
IS HERE·BY AGREED: 
"1. ·That there is a certain lease-hold agree-
ment between J. B. & R. E. Walker, Inc., as Les-
sors, and J. Kenneth ·Thayn, as L·essee, which 
lease is represented by an agreement, a copy of 
\vhich is attached as Exhibit 1. ·Thayn is the 
owner of a certain agreement dated April 11, 
19'61, between himself and J. B. Walker and 
Gudvor W. Brady, a copy of which agreement 
is attached, incorporated and made a part of 
this agreement as Exhibit 2. 
"2. Thayn does by this instrument assign to 
Sumsion all right, title and interest that he has 
in the said agreements attached as Exhibit 1 and 
Exhibit 2 for the remaining portion of the term 
and Sumsion agrees to pay Thayn for said agree-
ments the sum of One Dollar ($1.00) per year, 
said payment to be made on or before the lOth 
day of April of each year, commencing with the 
lOth day of April, 19·64, except that if ·Sumsion 
fails to make payments as agreed upon in para-
graph 8, this lease-hold shall revert back to 
Thayn. 
"3. In the event that Sumsion is compelled 
to cease operation in resp·ect to the asphalt hot 
plant operation within a period of two (2) years 
from the date of this agreement as a result of 
court order, 1Thayn shall move and erect original 
equipment at his expense to any location in Salt 
Lake 'County designated by Sumsion. Sumsion 
shall assume all costs of securing property or 
lease at the new designated location and all other 
expenses beyond said move and erection. 
"4. It is contemplated that Sumsion will place 
upon the leasehold property buildings, fixtures 
5 
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and other imp.rovements, which will remain the 
property of Sumsion and at the expiration of 
this lease agreement, or if the said agreement is 
terminated by any means, Sumsion shall have 
the right to remove all buildings, fixtures and 
improvements placed upon the said property 
including fences." ' 
On January 1, 1964, plaintiff sent a statement to 
defendant for $1,050.00 for a proportionate share of the 
taxes for the years 1961, 1962. and 1963 (Ex. P-2). De-
fendant admitted that he received the statement, had not 
paid it and had paid no taxes or other amounts called for 
by the statement (R. 64 and E,x. P-2). 
Defendant admitted that he never designated the 
specific area to be occupied by him (R. 65). No fence 
was ever erected (R. 76). No consent in writing to the 
assignment was ever had (R. 78, 79). 
Sumsion knew and understood that defendant could 
not assign the lease without the written consent of 
plaintiff (R. 81, 82). Shortly thereafter Sumsion went 
into possession (R. 83) and then came to request plaintiff 
to approve the assignment (R. 84) and was informed by 
letter as to the terms upon which an approval could be 
obtained. Sumsion has remained in possession and pur-
chased material and occupied the premises under a 
tentative arrangement with plaintiff until the matter 
was settled. 
No adjustment of the problem having been had, 
plaintiff then served the notice of termination on April 
10, 19'64·. (Ex. P-3). 
6 
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ARGU~1ENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT DID NO'T ABUSE ITS DISCRETIO·N IN 
SE'TTING 'THE FIRST CAUSE O·F ACTION FOR TRIAL 
AS APPRO,PRIATE FO·R DECLARATORY JUDGMENT IN 
ADVANCE ·O·F HEARING ON 'THE OTHER CAUSES O·F 
ACTION. 
The Complaint alleges eight causes of action. The 
first cause alleges the dispute as to vvhether the leasehold 
agreement has or has not been ter1ninated by reason of 
the breaches by defendant and the notice of termination 
by plaintiff, with defendant remaining in possession by 
and through his assignee, Sumsion. 
The ren1aining causes of action have to do with 
responsibility for costs of litigation instituted by neigh-
bors for clailned creation of nuisance, and efforts by the 
·County to abate the operations of defendant under the 
zoning la-vvs. In addition there were claims for damag2s 
for failure to pay for materials delivered. 
It is clearly evident that the first cause of action 
is severable frorn the others; and there was no reason 
for tying up this property under a contract that had 
been tern1inated by breach and that had resulted so dis-
astrously to the contracting parties, not only in cost of 
litigation but also in disclosure of contract deficiencies 
as a basis for a working agreement. Defendant testified 
(R. 69), that the lease contract was drawn without legal 
assistance, and it was not adequate in its provisions as 
to who should bear the burdens of defending nuisance 
actions instituted by reason of the hot plant operations 
7 
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of defendant. In characteristic fashion defendant refused 
to assun1e the cost of defense of these rnatters, and plain-
tiff had no alternative but to defend his right to conduct 
hot plant operations on his ground. 
'There were three grounds alleged for rescission about 
vvhich there was no material dispute: ( 1) assignment of 
the contract without written consent; ( 2) failure of de-
fendant to designate and fence the area occupied; and 
( 3) refusal to pay the taxes on that portion of the tract; 
all of \vhich were clearly set forth as obligations of the 
defendant in the contract, and all of \\7hich had been 
violated by defendant. 
The co1nplaint \vas filed :Wlay 6, 1964, and on I\lay 
26, 1964, defendant obtained an order giving him to and 
including June 2, 1964, within which to answer; and then 
he filed only denial of the alleged violations. 
Plaintiff thereupon filed an affida-vit as to the fact 
that the denial was sharn and untrue, and moved the 
Court for an order setting the case for im1nediate trial 
of the first cause of action. This motion \vas argued 
on June 12, 1964. Thereafter the trial was set for July 
9, 1964, and then reset for July 21, 196-±, before Hon. 
Stewart Thi. Hanson. 
As soon as defendant received the first notice of 
setting on J-uly 1, 1964, he irnrnediately filed numerous 
papers arnending his pleadings and setting up 1nany 
r~asons \Yhy the trial shoula not be had. All of these 
1natt(\rs \Yere heard by the Court a.t the tin1e set for 
8 
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hearing, and the objections were over-ruled and the case 
was heard. Defendant 'vas given the fullest opportunity 
to present whatever evidence he had, and defendant's 
brief does not shovv any prejudice to defendant. lie had 
had t-vvo and a half n1onths to prepare his defense. It is 
difficult indeed to say that you haven't assigned a lease 
\Vhen the written assignment is before the Court; and it 
is difficult to show that you have paid the taxes when 
you have to admit that you haven't; and it is impossible 
to say that the other fellow is to designate the area and 
do some fencing when the contract expressly says that 
you are to do it. Defendant had nothing to go on, and 
he didn't go anyvvhere. 
This case comes squarely within the provisions of 
Sec. 78-33-1, Sec. 78-33-2 and 78-33-3 of the Judicial Code 
relating to Declaratory J udg1nents. It also comes square-
ly vvithin the purvie"\v of Rules 56 and 57. 
Only the wildest imagination would cause an individ-
ual to say that a decree declaring a leasehold contract 
to be terminated is not final as to the existence or non-
existence of the document as a binding docu1nent. 
POINT II 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THA·T DE-
FEND:ANTS' ACTIONS HAD GIVEN PLAINTIFF THE 
RIGHT TO 'TERMINATE, CANCEL AND ANNUL THE 
RIGHTiS OF DEFENDANT TO 'THE LEASEHOLD AGR,EE-
MENT. 
The Court properly found the lease had been terin-
inated by reason of breaches of the agreement by defend-
9 
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ant; and properly held there had been no \Va1ver by 
plaintiff. 
As before stated, plaintiff relied upon three breaches 
for its right of termination: ( 1) assignment without 
written consent; (2) failure to pay taxes; (3) failure 
to designate the area to be utilized and to fence the same. 
The facts were undisputed as to each and all of the 
breaches. Defendant admitted that he had never had 
written consent to the assignment; that he had never 
paid the taxes and that he had never designated the 
area to be occupied nor fe:q.ced the same. 
The English language seems to have little or no 
meaning to defendant. The lease agreement expressly 
provides in Paragraph 1 that the lessee will designate 
the area needed, have it surveyed, and the area thus 
described will he added as a supplement to the agreement, 
which \Vas never done. Paragraph 3 expressly provides 
that the lessee agrees to pay to the lessor the pro-rata 
of property taxes based upon the ratio of that area to 
the whole tract. Paragraph 4 expressly provides that 
the lessee will fence the area. The only answer defendant 
makes to this failure is stated by the attorney for defend-
ant, Mr. Frost, in the following language: 
"Yes vve will admit that he did not, and we 
will contend that this is an agreement and obli-
. gation of Walker as provided in the agreement." 
Apparently the English language 1neans no more to 
the attorney for defendant than it does to defendant 
himself. 
10 
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On Page 16 of the transcript, M.r. Thayn says the 
reason he did nothing about fencing was because 1fr. 
y·y-alker was supposed to designate the area. 
On the taxes he says the reason he didn't pay the 
taxes was because the ·County "\vas supposed to segregate 
the amounts. On Page 17 he says he didn't make the 
tax payment because the County hadn't said it was fair. 
By the simple process of failing to designate the area, 
he felt entirely relieved from all responsibility to pay 
taxes on the tract occupied by hin1, and yet this was the 
only rental he was supposed to pay aside from the nom-
inal amount of $1.00 per year, which he didn't pay either. 
The defendant tried to appear "dumb," somewhat of a 
country bumpkin who didn't quite understand the mean-
ing of words. His failure to put up any money, even 
for taxes, while occupying the premises rent free for three 
( 3) years, from April11, 19·61, to the date of termination 
on April 10, 1964, shows, however, that he was not as 
dumb as he tried to appear; and in selling his equipment 
to Sumsion for $128,000 with $25,000 down and interest 
at 55'o, shows that he seems to know his finances o.k. 
Just before trial defendant abandoned his denials, 
abandoned his position that the assignment was not the 
real thing but tentative only, and finally came to rest 
upon the allegation that plaintiff had waived the alleged 
breaches. 
There was no evidence whatsoever that plaintiff 
\Vaived the require1nent to designate the area or to pay 
the taxes or to fence it, and the nearest that defendant 
11 
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came to proving even the slightest sen1blance of a \vaiver 
is contained on Page 69 of the transcript 'vherein ~ir. 
Thayn testified that sometin1e priol· to the time he n1ade 
the deal '"-rith l\1r. Sumsion, he told l\1r. vValker that hP 
vvas getting old and that he 'vould like to get out of hard 
construction \Vork, and he had talked with Mr. Sumsion, 
and Mr. Walker thought it would be a good idea (R. 
69-70). 
lie also produced evidence that JYir. \V alker kne·w 
that Sumsion had gone into possession and that Mr. 
Walker thereafter made some sales to Sumsion and that 
Walker rnade no objection to Mr. Sumsion operating the 
property (R. 73). Ho,vever, it then appeared upon cross-
examination (R. 78-79) that the agreement between de-
fendant and Sumsion was prepared by the attorneys 
for the parties, and the following evidence was produced 
upon cross-examination of l\{r. Thttyn (R. 78): 
"0 \.!" 
"A. 
"Q. 
"A. 
Did you or anyone else, at that time, 
advise Mr. Sumsion or any of his at-
torneys that your original lease with 
Walker was not assignable unless you 
got his consent in writing~ 
I think they "rere a\Yare of it because -
Thank you. That answers it. As a 
1natter of fact, ~Ir. 'Thayn, at any time, 
including to the present day, have you 
ever obtained a consent in writing from 
the vV alkers regarding your right to 
assign that lease~ 
"\V ell, I don't know· as it has been par-
ticularly put that 'vay. ,v~ e told the1n 
they \vere going up there, and they gave 
12 
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us an agreement. Don't try to answer 
me if I a1n dumb. Let it go that way, 
but the way you put it isn't the truth." 
Mr. Richard Sumsion, called as a witness for de-
fendant, testified that when he made this agreement with 
1Ir. 'fhayn he read the agreement, that he read the coven-
ant in there that ·Thayn was not to assign the lease 
without the written consent of Walker (R. 81); that he 
definitely understood it (R. 82); that after Inaking his 
agreement \vith Thayn he and his attorney caine up to 
the office of the attorney for vV alker with the request 
the vV alker approve the assignment of the contract, and 
that thereafter he received a letter setting forth the 
reasons why it could not be done. He then made an in-
dependent arrangement with l\1r. Walker under which 
he had been receiving and purchasing material pending 
a settlement of this litigation with ~Jr. Thayn; that his 
occupancy of the premises and purchase of materials 
\Vas under that tentative me1norandu1n, not under the 
Thayn lease. 
It will thus be seen that while defendant quotes 
lR\V \vith reference to \vaiver, his facts do not fit the 
la\v; there was no waiver, and the Court found that there 
was no waiver, and the evidence sustains the finding. 
This case come squarely within the provisions of 
three Utah cases. They represent the law of this case 
as pronounced by this Court and as followed by the 
District Court: Powerine Compa.ny vs. Russell's, Inc., 
et al, 103 Dtah 441, 135 P.2d 906; Powerine Company vs. 
Zions Savings Bank & Trust Company, 106 Utah 384, 
13 
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148 P.2d 807. In this case the ·Court restated its findings 
in the forn1cr case in the follo\ving language: 
"That the lease executed by defendant John 
I-I. Russell, leasing certain real property to plain-
tiff was not assignable, and therefore by assigning 
such lease plaintiff breached its conditions so that 
John H. R.ussell "\Yas entitled to recission." 
To similar effect is the 1nost recent case of Gates 
22.?. 
vs. Daines, 3 Ut.2d 95, ~ P.2d 458. 
In this connection it is very significant that the 
agreement (Ex. P-1) between ·Thayn and Sumsion pro-
vides in Paragraph 3 that in the event Sumsion is coln-
pelled to cease operation in respect to the asphalt hot 
plant within a period of t\vo years as the result of 
court order, "·Thayn shall move and erect original equip-
ment at his expense to any location in Salt Lake ~county 
designated by Sumsion." 'I'his is certainly a most unusual 
provision to be contained in a contract based upon an 
assun1ption t:nat consent has been obtained to assignment 
of the lease, and that the equipment \Yas to remain on the 
property during the period of the lease term in accord-
ance with the provisions of the lease from Walker to 
Thayn. It is more consistent \Yith the idea that the 
parties knew they \Yere doing so1nething \Yhich might 
or might not be approved or "~hich 1night or 1night not 
result in litigation, and "\Vere providing a \Yay out for the 
parties the1nselves \\'"ithout regard to \\Talker or anyone 
else. 
14 
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POINrr III 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FINDING THAT THE 
AGREEMiE·NT BE'T'WEEN DE;FENDANT AND SUM.SIO~N 
WAS AN AS~SIGNMENT, NO~T A SUB-LE~ASE. 
The agreement on November 12, 1963, between Thayn 
and Sumison is an assignment, not a sub-lease. 
Here again defendant quotes law to the effect that 
a sub-lease is not a violation of a covenant against as-
signment, but the facts do not fit the law. P'aragraph 8 
of the lease forbids "assignment of the lease or any part 
thereof or any of the rights hereunder" without first 
obtaining the vvritten consent of the lessor. The restric-
tion is broader than ordinary restrictions. Obviously the 
reason for it was the fact that the lessee was paying 
little or nothing for the privilege of occupying the pre-
rnises ,and the lessor was reserving to himself the right 
to determine who vvould or would not be the occupant, 
and the conditions under which the occupancy vvas to 
be had. It was entirely within the right of Walker to 
refuse assignment of a lease which had proven so fruitful 
of litigation with neighbors, the County, and even with 
the defendant himself. If the clearest English and the 
1nost positive obligations with reference to fencing, 
designation of area, and payment of taxes could not be 
understood by defendant, and the clearest of language 
against assignment of the leasehold rights or any part 
thereof, or any interest therein, could not be compre-
hended and understood by anyone as successful as Mr. 
Thayn and as intelligent as his counsel, what then was 
the use of perpetuating that document by having it as-
signed to others~ 
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It is little short of an affront to the intelligence of 
this Court to argue that the follo,ving \vords, "Thayn doP~ 
by this instrument assign to Sumsion all right, title 
and interest that he has in said agreements attached a~ 
Exhibit 1 and 2 for the remaining portion of the tern1" 
does not mean \vhat it says. Nothing \vhatsoever is rP-
served to Thayn save and excepting that it is provided 
in the sa1ne paragraph that if Sumsion fails to make 
payments on the purchase price of equipment he is 
buying, the leasehold shall revert to Thayn. There was 
no reversionary interest as referred to in the authorities 
cited in the brief, nor \Yas the occupancy of the preinises 
by Sumsion to be in any way contingent upon or subject 
to any supervisory right of Thayn during the lease 
term. The document was what it states - a complete 
assignment of the lease and to be absolute and not con-
tingent in any way if Sumsion n1ade the payments for 
\vhich he was legally obligated. There \Yas no such thing 
as a reversionarv interest as such an interest is kno,vn 
oJ 
in the law. 
This point is raised no\v for the first time on appeal. 
Defendant never pleaded that the assignment was in 
fact a sublease. He denied it existed; then said it ·was 
tentative only; and then said it vvas \vaived; but he never 
presented to the Trial Court the proposition that it \vas 
in fact a sub-lease. Nevertheless, he \Yas wrong here as he 
\Vas in the other positions that he took. 
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Plaintiff submits to this ·Court that the matter "\Vas 
properly handled by the District Court, properly decided, 
and should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
H. ARNO~L,D RICH and 
LEONARD· W. E.L.TON 
510 American Oil Building 
Salt Lake ·City, Utah 
Attorneys for Respondents 
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